Cordon and Knock
Mosul, Iraq
250 miles north of Baghdad
October 21, 2005
with 4/23rd Infantry, 172nd Striker Brigade, US Army, Anchorage Alaska
250 miles north of Baghdad
October 21, 2005
with 4/23rd Infantry, 172nd Striker Brigade, US Army, Anchorage Alaska
The soldiers of the 172nd Striker Brigade have a problem. The insurgents in this town are stubborn, and the soldiers deal with small arms fire sprayed at their vehicles every day. IEDs, or roadside bombs, are set several times a week in this city, as the insurgents try to catch American vehicles in the blast of a roadside bomb. That's no easy matter, especially as these soldiers run the Striker armored cars which, contrary to media reports, have the confidence of these crews on the mean streets of Mosul, if not that of many commentators.
The problem is how to generate the information that will finally, successfully, undermine the insurgency in this area. The insurgency here used to be much more aggressive. Compared to six months ago, there is much less activity than there was. But there is still plenty of activity.
The operations officer of this unit, the 4-23rd Infantry, is taking as holistic approach as possible. There have been a number of successful counterinsurgency campaigns this century, including Malaya and Northern Ireland. Others such campaigns have been failures, think the (somewhat parallel) Vietnam or Rhodesia. These provide some guidelines on what and what not to do.
There is also the broader approach these operations-section soldiers are taking, like contacting university professors to find out what the dynamics in the city really are like. Yes, this unit is doing all this, and it�s a good start.
But more is needed than theory. The soldiers are trying to apply the right theiory to the area they cover in southeast Mosul.
Hard information is the goal of this effort, as well as that information's inescapable flip-side, the cooperation of the populace necessary to supply it.
And while most US givernment agencies are in town trying to dig out what is needed, the units here on the ground are the key interface between the theory and the local population.
So every day and night the soldiers knock on doors and talk to the people in their own houses. This sometimes yields good information, sometimes no information, and occasionally a sullenness and unwillingness to talk.
But the soldiers who walk into the front yard, knock on doors and spend ten minutes with Iraqi families inside the houses feel this is one of the best ways the war can be won. In the living rooms of Iraqi families, talking one on one.
The insurgents here don�t like it when the local Iraqis offer up information. They recognize this as their weakness. A popular 1-800 telephone tip line yielded so much information that the insurgents blew up the mobile phone towers around this hill-locked town, cutting phone service and, more importantly, access to the tips line.
Anonymous, accurate information is what's needed here. It's access and denial is the central battleground of this conflict.
For the soldiers based in Alaska, that mans visiting one house at a time, generating one anonymous tip after another that has to be chased down. Using this model this is going to be a long war. But until the operations people can dig out a better paradigm from the depths of military history, this is what it�s going to take.
The problem is how to generate the information that will finally, successfully, undermine the insurgency in this area. The insurgency here used to be much more aggressive. Compared to six months ago, there is much less activity than there was. But there is still plenty of activity.
The operations officer of this unit, the 4-23rd Infantry, is taking as holistic approach as possible. There have been a number of successful counterinsurgency campaigns this century, including Malaya and Northern Ireland. Others such campaigns have been failures, think the (somewhat parallel) Vietnam or Rhodesia. These provide some guidelines on what and what not to do.
There is also the broader approach these operations-section soldiers are taking, like contacting university professors to find out what the dynamics in the city really are like. Yes, this unit is doing all this, and it�s a good start.
But more is needed than theory. The soldiers are trying to apply the right theiory to the area they cover in southeast Mosul.
Hard information is the goal of this effort, as well as that information's inescapable flip-side, the cooperation of the populace necessary to supply it.
And while most US givernment agencies are in town trying to dig out what is needed, the units here on the ground are the key interface between the theory and the local population.
So every day and night the soldiers knock on doors and talk to the people in their own houses. This sometimes yields good information, sometimes no information, and occasionally a sullenness and unwillingness to talk.
But the soldiers who walk into the front yard, knock on doors and spend ten minutes with Iraqi families inside the houses feel this is one of the best ways the war can be won. In the living rooms of Iraqi families, talking one on one.
The insurgents here don�t like it when the local Iraqis offer up information. They recognize this as their weakness. A popular 1-800 telephone tip line yielded so much information that the insurgents blew up the mobile phone towers around this hill-locked town, cutting phone service and, more importantly, access to the tips line.
Anonymous, accurate information is what's needed here. It's access and denial is the central battleground of this conflict.
For the soldiers based in Alaska, that mans visiting one house at a time, generating one anonymous tip after another that has to be chased down. Using this model this is going to be a long war. But until the operations people can dig out a better paradigm from the depths of military history, this is what it�s going to take.
posted by Doug at 7:38 AM
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