In The War Zone, A Toolbox Is Best

For technicians clearing landmines left over from previous wars, there
is a thing called a 'toolbox' approach to getting rid of the old
buried weapons.
At one time deminers used a pointy probe and a metal detector.
Then they tried dogs. Then flails, which rotate chains and bash the
ground and cause landmines to explode on contact. There are all sorts
of things to lift landmines (of which there are probably 35 or so
million left in the world).
But nothing works better than the toolbox.
The toolbox is simple - it just means using all of the methods
above and more. Use whatever you can get hold of, and don't be picky
about what technique it is, because combinations of techniques work
better than a single-serving approach.
As with landmines, so too with Iraq. The military started by just
killing insurgents. Lots of them. Then it progressed to also
offering reconstruction projects at the village level. Later added in
a lot of unmanned aerial drones. Ended up by paying the Sunni and
Shias insurgents to fight with the soldiers and not against them.
Also added in political reform and a few other measures. And finally,
paid for new security centers in villages manned by local militias,
and more police stations.
It has worked a treat so far in Iraq (where only a handful of
areas remain to be pacified). But not because one thing worked; in
the end it worked because everything in concert worked together.
So now to Afghanistan. Unfortunately for the Americans, until now
Afghanistan has been the opposite of a toolbox.
The country was fragmented; the Americans had one sector, the
Europeans and Canadians another. There was little coordination.
Their approaches differed. The British lacked money to pay for
village-level projects. The Europeans lacked the political willpower
to hunt down insurgents. The political reforms was slow in coming
(and though they are coming, thus far less than a dozen reform-minded
governors have been appointed).
The Afghan police were neglected, undermanned and underpaid until
2006, and even now are pretty bad. And until 2008 or even 2009, even
in US-controlled areas, many districts in insurgent-infested provinces
received scanty military attention because there has not been enough
manpower.
But now it looks at last like that could all change. Maybe.
General David Petraeus took over as the Central Command commander
last fall, and immediately let it be known that he wanted the Afghan
tribes to be armed, and militias formed to fight al Qaeda. This
mimics the Sunni militias that were armed in Iraq.
And the US forces now come under a unified command, which is
supposed to clear up the US/European disconnect, though so far that
seems to have had limited effect.
And thousand more soldiers are heading to Afghanistan.
So the beginnings of a toolbox mentality under Petraeus are now
faintly visible.
The problem with the old approach is it's too simple. Soldiers
build some wells in a valley and hope the locals will push out al
Qaeda and the Taliban in grateful return, which was the past US
strategy. Often the villagers would agree, but then it wouldn't
happen. How does an Afghan farmer face down a dozen armed insurgents
who visits his house? He doesn't.
Now instead there would be a militia, more US troops nearby, and
the next valley over would likely have more US troops too, so it
wouldn't be an insurgent stronghold infecting the neighboring valleys.
Many analysts say the likely increase of US forces from 30,000 to
60,000 would be window dressing. That the Soviets deployed 120,000
people and they lost. 30,000 extra people would make no difference,
goes the complaint.
These analysts are wrong. An extra 120 people, or even 30 people,
in a valley can make all the difference. 30,000 people is a lot of
valleys and villages. And the Soviet operations were inefficient and
often poorly led.
The main US bases such as Bagram and Salerno and Jalalabad have
thus far sucked up thousands of US forces. Luckily there is hardly
any room for more people on Bagram, which holds over 15,000 military
and civilians. The new troops will have to go into the field.
It's all part of a toolbox approach, without which American forces
in Afghanistan are going to continue to experience the long, generally
lonely and often unimaginative struggle that has previously been their
lot to suffer.

US troops Are Iraq's Insurance Policy

Al Asad, Anbar Province, western Iraq - Like a rash that refuses to
fade, violence persists in Iraq. Mosul in the north, Baghdad and
areas north of Baghdad see daily attacks, though most attacks are
aimed at the Iraqi security forces.
The toll of American combat deaths, which was once a flood reaching
125 a month, is now a drip of less than half a dozen a month. Officers
say driving accidents are more likely to kill troops than the enemy.
In northern Iraq and here in western Iraq, where it is quietest,
hundreds if not thousands of US troops wonder why they are here and
complain they have too little to do. The biggest complaint here at Al
Asad, a large Marine base near Syria, is that the Marines spend too
much time in the gym because their patrols have been cut down. It is
no big secret that the Marine top brass has been trying to exit Anbar
entirely and shift their forces to Afghanistan for over a year.
Still fighting in Iraq are remnants of Al Qaeda, remnants of the Shia
militias, remnants of Sunni Islamists and Sunni nationalists. Add in
localized tribal fights. Add in local retribution against the Iraqi
government or the US military for the occasional missteps, such as
accidental shootings of Iraqi civilians. Add in the organized
criminal elements, many of whom were spawned by the legitimate
political insurgents. The violence in Iraq has fragmented, which is
both good and bad.
It's bad because no one group laying down its arms will quell a whole
mass of fighting. The Sunnis gave up in November 2006 and the effects
were enormously far-reaching. But that won't likely happen again on
such a massive scale.
Then again it's also good, because as anyone who has watched tag-team
wrestling on television will know, opponents operating piecemeal are
much easier to cut up than those who fight as a unified team.
So the question remains, just why does America still have 130,000
plus troops in Iraq if many of them are wondering what they are going
to do today, tomorrow and the next day to justify their (generally tax
free) pay checks?
They are here because America is Iraq's insurance policy.
If the Shia militias reorganize, as analysts in Baghdad say they are
(unsuccessfully) trying to. If Al Qaeda manages to kick off sectarian
violence again (as it is likely trying to do, with the recent killing
of dozens of Shia pilgrims heading to Karbala). If Sunni nationalists
feel the Maliki government has stuck it to them, and want to stick it
back (as is the fear, with the government's avowed aim of dismantling
the widespread pro-government Sunni counter-terrorism groups, named
the Sons of Iraq).
If any of these things should happen, US forces are ready to step in
and do what the Iraqi security forces may or may not be able to do for
themselves.
General Petraeus reportedly has sent a plan calling for a 23-month
withdrawal from Iraq to the White House. That's longer than Barack
Obama's repeated 16-month preference. Most likely the withdrawal will
never be down to zero at all, despite tough talk by the Maliki
government and the White House, and few people in Iraq I've spoke to
expect the US military presence will ever reach zero.
Officers of the Iraqi security forces say they still need US support,
moral as much as material, as they slowly improve. Above all, America
provides the moral fiber that gives the ISF the psychological edge
over their well-armed, determined, though now battered, opponents.
These are the forces at play in Iraq.
How soon America can draw down its troops without upsetting the
delicate balance of these forces is the game that will be played out
for the rest of 2009 in Iraq and Washington.

The Afghan Mountain War

Pech Valley, northeast Afghanistan - Afghanistan is a mountainous
country, with hills of the south giving way to mountains of the Hindu
Kush in the northeast. Here in this northeastern province named Kunar
it is incredibly rough and rugged. Only 13 percent of the
countryside is arable, says its governor. The rest of the province is
steep mountainside - good for woodcutting and lousy for pretty much
every other kind of living. (And even the wood is dwindling at an
alarming rate)
If this country is mountainous, then the war in this country will be
won in the mountains. But how do you win a war in the mountains? Why
in the valleys of course.
Some valleys the war is being won, in others it's not.
Example number one is a valley where the war is not being won.
In Kapisa province northeast of Kabul there is a valley named
Afghanya, after one of the villages near its mouth. It is a wild
place, where the security forces now fear to tread.
But this past spring, a small force of 50 or so national guardsmen
from Pennsylvania did tread that valley, which is 12 or so miles long
and has a couple of side valleys. These guardsmen walked it because,
they say, walking valleys is the best way to pacify them. You get to
know the locals, they get to know you, and it is coincidentally safer
than driving Humvees, which are vulnerable to roadside bombs.
In Afghanya the guardsmen walked, and the insurgents fought back.
About 100 insurgents live in the valley, and they had reinforcements.
Many of the firefights started when the guardsmen walked or drove up
the valley, and were ambushed on the way back.
Over the course of 4 months and about 40 firefights about a third of
the guardsmen were wounded, several seriously. No one was killed.
The insurgents suffered several hundred killed, from a combination of
air power and ground fire.
By the end, the guardsmen pushed the insurgents farther back into the
valley, and started talking to the villagers about bringing in
projects, such as wells and roads.
Then the guardsmen switched out and were replaced by roughly 350
French soldiers. The French soldiers are nice, personable people, but
they stopped going into the Afghanya valley. They don't like to walk,
and they seemed afraid of getting their thinly armored vehicles blown
up by roadside bombs.
With that number of soldiers the French should have put in
observation posts, pushing a permanent presence into the valley, say
the guardsmen, but they didn't. Instead they now concentrate on
patrolling the main road that runs through the province, rather than
venturing into the valleys like Afghanya that branch off that main
road.
Now the coalition is not welcome in Afghanya valley. The insurgents
have regrouped and no security forces ever go more than 2 kilometers
inside.
The guardsmen say it's a crying shame, but there isn't much they can
do about it. They were reassigned to protect a group of soldiers that
coordinate projects such as wells and schools in the same area. They
say security there is currently hopeless.
That is one failure.
The Korengal valley, a few miles from this base here in the Pech
valley, Kunar Province, is currently another failure.
It is nightmare. The locals dislike any foreigners, though they
tolerate the Taliban. The tiny US bases in the Korengal are under
constant attack. The US goal of pushing a road into the Korengal has
been on hold for 90 days, say the soldiers.
The road would connect the Korengal to another valley farther south,
bringing trade and prosperity, but it is stalled. The official plan
calls for the road project to be finished in 18 months, but the
reality will be more like 7 years, says the local US commander. He
says the Korengal isn't important enough to get too fussed over, and
is not the key to the region.
The Korengal then is failure number two.
In contrast, the Pech valley is the main valley from which the
Korengal runs. The Pech valley is doing well. It received a paved
road about 2 years ago, running its entire length. It runs on the
north side of the river that flows down the valley. A second road is
now being built on the south side of the river. Five US and Afghan
bases run along its length. These days the insurgents sit on the
slopes of the surrounding hillsides and lob down mortars and rockets
onto the bases. But they rarely hit anything worthwhile, though the
noise is impressive.
Despite the insurgent activity, the Pech and the town at its mouth,
Asadabad, is seeing a vigorous infusion of trade because of the road.
The villages at the valley are quiet, and more wells, roads, and water
projects are going in. Progress is being made.
The Pech then is a limited but growing success, and it has only been
about 2 years since development first arrived.
War in the valleys is tough. It requires manpower, both Afghan and
American, to build bases, establish security and then it requires
money to bring development, roads, wells and schools to villages.
(The next step is stamping out the corruption that the first wave of
government presence inevitably brings with it.)
It is all time consuming and costly. In Kunar, province-wide the US
spends $80 million on civil projects in a heavy year, and $50 million
on an average year.
Where bases, security, and development all coincide, the locals do
respond. Where they do not, the war grinds on.
In a mountainous country, the war is won or lost in the valleys.
America needs to hope that there are more winning valleys like the
Pech and fewer losing ones like Afghanya or the Korengal.
Success takes time, money and troops. For 6 years, from 2001-2006,
the right elements were too scarce here. That may now be changing.
More troops will be needed, and plenty of cash too, to make it all
work.